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I once had a post-doctoral fellow who,
upon discovering we had grown up a
quarter mile from each other in a small
town in Pennsylvania, commented on our
shared experience with, ‘‘Well, you know
what they say about Pennsylvania? There’s
Philadelphia, there’s Pittsburgh, and there’s
the state of Alabama in between.’’ That
blunt assessment (attributable to James
Carville) certainly resonated when I first
read about the Kitzmiller et al. v. Dover
Area School District case in late 2004.
Dover, indeed, is a small town in south
central Pennsylvania. At that time, the
Dover school board instructed 9th grade
biology teachers to read a statement that
evolution is only a theory for the origin of
species and to proffer an alternate expla-
nation called ‘‘intelligent design’’ (ID).
Tammy Kitzmiller, the mother of two
students in the Dover public schools,
together with a number of other plaintiffs
and assisted by the American Civil Liber-
ties Union (ACLU), sued the Dover school
district for an injunction against the
statement and use of materials in science
class as a breach of the First Amendment
of the US Constitution.
At the bench during this remarkable
trial sat the Federal Judge for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania, the Honorable
Judge John E. Jones, III (see Image 1).
Jones, a Republican and a Bush appoin-
tee, was assumed by many and feared by
others to be inclined to rule for the
defendants. However, in a stunning Mem-
orandum Opinion (see http://www.pamd.
uscourts.gov/kitzmiller/kitzmiller_342.pdf),
Jones excoriated intelligent design, waxed
eloquent about the meaning and practice of
science, and, for the skeptics, restored faith
in the fairness of the judicial system.
My call to the Judge’s chambers in
request for an interview was answered in
vivo by his assistant, who suggested simply
e-mailing the Judge directly. I did, and
back came an immediate reply of ‘‘Happy
to do it.’’ On the appointed July day, in
near 100-degree heat, I drove from my
father’s home in Pottstown along country
roads through the corn-laden, cow-dotted
agricultural landscape that I love. But as I
got closer to my destination, the state
capital of Harrisburg, billboard outcrop-
pings disrupted the fields’ quiet beauty
with warnings such as, ‘‘It’s your choice –
heaven or hell.’’ It appeared that I had
arrived at the crux of the matter.
Gitschier: I am very excited to meet
you. There are roughly three areas I want
to talk to you about.
Jones: Do my best.
Gitschier: One has to do with your
background—your thinking about evolu-
tion, intelligent design, creationism—
going into the trial, your experience
during the trial, and then afterwards—
how this might have changed you.
The second is to help me through the
legal stuff. I’m not a lawyer and I’m going
to be writing this for an audience of
geneticists.
The third is a shorter question—the
ramifications of this decision on public
education in the US.
So, let’s first cover a little background.
Jones: I’m from Pottsville, PA, which is
in the anthracite coal region of northeast
central Pennsylvania. And I was raised in
Orwigsburg, a little town of about 2,000
not far from there. It’s in an old industrial
coal county. I went to Dickinson College
and Dickinson School of Law, and re-
turned there to practice. My family roots
are very deep there. It occurred to me that
I’d probably be able to start a successful
law practice back there and I was, happily,
right about that.
Gitschier: What kind of law did you
practice?
Jones: I was a general practitioner,
which increasingly is a dinosaur. I used to
say that I was a half-an-inch deep and a
half-mile wide. I needed to know a little
about a lot of different things. I was the
quintessential country lawyer.
Gitschier: So—wills, small disputes?
Jones: Everything. I did a lot of
litigation. I liked to go to court. I became
a lawyer because of the allure of the
courtroom, not necessarily to be chained
to an office desk.
Gitschier: I’d like to deal with some of
the legal stuff I don’t understand. Kitzmil-
ler was a suit. What does that mean? I
usually think of suing for money or
restitution.
Jones: That’s a very good question.
There is a statute, known as section 1983,
in the Federal Law, and in layman’s terms,
it’s an enabling statute and it allows you to
bring suit in federal court if you believe
that a constitutional right has been
violated. And notably, in the context of
the Dover case, it allows you to recover
your fees and costs if you prevail.
When this suit was brought in Decem-
ber of 2004, although the statute also
allows you to seek money damages, that
was not the request. The request was for
an injunction. An injunction is a legal
ruling that stops something, typically, from
happening. The plaintiffs asked for an
injunction to stop the policy from being
implemented in the first instance. It was to
be implemented in January of 2005 after it
had been enacted in 2004.
That’s why it was a bench trial, and not a
jury trial, to anticipate a question you may
have, because when you ask for an
injunction, only a judge can grant an
injunction. Had they [the plaintiffs] asked
for money damages, it would have been
brought to a jury. They were never
interested, it appeared to me, in money
damages. They were interested in stopping
the policy from being implemented. That
was their real goal throughout the litigation.
Gitschier: You’re right, I was going to
ask you about why this was a bench trial.
Jones: Everybody does.
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1925] was a jury trial.
Jones: Well, that was a criminal
prosecution. John Scopes was prosecuted
under a Tennessee statute, which had
been little used, that prohibited the
teaching of evolution.
Gitschier: Little used because nobody
taught evolution in Tennessee back then!
Somebody put him up to it, didn’t they?
Jones: As I read it, Scopes, who was
certainly pro-evolution himself, was kind
of dragged into the fray and set up to teach
evolution with the understanding that he
would be defended. And the punishment
that he was exposed to was essentially
fines, so there wasn’t much risk to Scopes,
and of course, the benefit to Scopes was
that he would be the centerpiece of this
spectacular trial.
The marked difference, for historical
purposes, is that Clarence Darrow, who
represented Scopes, wanted to inject some
scientific testimony into the trial, and the
trial judge would not allow that testimony.
So, it was really on the statute itself—did
Scopes violate the statute itself?
Gitschier: Which he did.
Jones: He did. And the most memora-
ble moment, as you may recall, is when
Darrow called his opposing council,
William Jennings Bryan, as a witness.
That would never happen today. Bryan
didn’t have to take the stand, even then,
but filled with excessive hubris, he took the
stand and was eviscerated and embar-
rassed by Darrow. And the post-script was
that Bryan died within a week of the trial.
Gitschier: I’m having trouble figuring
out why we keep having this battle about
fundamentalist beliefs in our public
schools. I keep asking the question: Didn’t
we solve this problem already?
Jones: No.
Gitschier: And cutting to the chase,
have we now solved the problem?
Jones: No.
Gitschier: OK, so let’s talk through
some of the background and figure out
why not.
Jones: Scopes took place 80 years ago,
and the matter was fairly dormant after
that.
Gitschier: Why?
Jones: For decades afterwards, evolu-
tion was not substantially taught or taught
at all.
Gitschier: In Tennessee or anywhere?
Jones: Anywhere. But by the ’50s in
the US, with Sputnik and the Cold War,
there was a belief that we were falling
drastically behind in science education
and in other things, and you began to
see a much more dedicated science
component of education.
However, in certain pockets of the
United States, particularly the South,
there were anti-evolution statutes still on
the books, and starting in the late 1960s,
there was a progression of cases…
Gitschier: Starting with Epperson v.
Arkansas?
Jones: Well, Susan Epperson’s case.
Susan was a young biology teacher who
was involved in a lawsuit that had to do
with a law prohibiting the teaching of
evolution.
It was the same thing as Scopes, but
now we’re going to go after the statute itself.
And Susan, whom I’ve met—a marvelous
woman—was the prototypical plaintiff.
She was a person of faith. She was young.
She was telegenic, articulate, and she
agreed to be the plaintiff in that case,
which went all the way to the Supreme
Court of the United States.
The result of Epperson was that a law
that banned the teaching of evolution is
struck down.
Gitschier: That law was in the State of
Arkansas, and it was ruled that the
Arkansas statute on the banning of
teaching evolution was unconstitutional.
Did that immediately, though, translate to
other state laws?
Jones: Yes. It didn’t ‘‘translate’’ to
other state laws, but the Supreme Court,
the highest court in the land, had spoken.
Not per se; it ruled on the statute it had
before it. But to the extent that other
Image 1. Judge John E. Jones, III.
doi:10.1371/journal.pgen.1000297.g001
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statute, the ruling meant that the wind had
gone out of them. You couldn’t enforce
them.
Gitschier: So did it mean that evolu-
tion was now taught in Alabama or
Tennessee, for example?
Jones: Not necessarily. It was still up to
the school board whether they wanted to
teach it or not.
But then, what states did was this: They
said, ‘‘OK fine, we understand that we
can’t prohibit the teaching of evolution,’’
so they developed what has been called a
‘‘balanced treatment’’ statute, which said
that if you are going to teach evolution,
then you have to teach creationism next to
it.
The states said, ‘‘We must live with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Epperson v.
Arkansas, so now we’re going to try to
figure a way around it and get the best
deal we can. We’ll hold our nose, we don’t
like this, but if we’re going to teach
evolution, we’re going to teach creation-
ism at the same time, as an alternative to
evolution.’’
You’ve got a succession of cases, and
I’m not trying to be encyclopedic, but
again the Court said, ‘‘You’re not listen-
ing. You can’t teach creationism and call it
what it is not.’’
Gitschier: These were federal court
rulings?
Jones: These were all federal court
rulings because they deal with the Consti-
tution. Then following that was, ‘‘How
about this, we’ll have you teach ‘creation
science’.’’ And after drilling into that, the
Court [in Edwards v. Aguillard] said, ‘‘No,
a studied examination of creation science
indicates that it is nothing more than
creationism labeled in a different way.’’
Gitschier: So, once creationism or
creation science is struck down in one
case, then what happens to all the other
places that teach creation science?
Jones: Well, when the Supreme Court
of the United States speaks, they can’t do
it. The bottom line is that as that line of
cases concluded, you knew that you
couldn’t ban the teaching of evolution,
you knew that you couldn’t pass a
‘‘balanced treatment’’ statute, and you
knew that you couldn’t re-label creation-
ism as creation science and have it pass
constitutional muster.
Which then set the stage for intelligent
design.
Gitschier: I read that you learned
about this suit on the radio while driving
home from work one day.
Jones: I was leaving this courthouse in
Harrisburg, and I heard on the news from
a local radio station that a very large
lawsuit had been filed. There was a press
conference at the state capitol rotunda,
right across the way, by the plaintiffs’
attorneys and that the suit was an
establishment clause.
Gitschier: When you say ‘‘large,’’ you
don’t mean financially large.
Jones: Large, meaning impactful, no-
table, involving a big issue. And lawyers
for the plaintiffs, the ACLU and a firm
from Philadelphia, Pepper Hamilton, and
the plaintiffs all appeared in the capitol
rotunda. And they said that the suit had
been filed in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, which is my district, and
I’ve joked since then that I had two
thoughts then. One, although I consider
myself reasonably well-read, I could not
remember hearing about ID before, so I
really didn’t know what it was. And two, I
wondered who would get the case. And
then forgot about it until I got into my
Williamsport Chambers the following
morning and looked at my new cases.
Gitschier: How many Middle District
judges might have seen the case?
Jones: At the time there were five of us.
I got it by the luck of the draw. It rotates in
a sequence. I’d like to tell you it’s because
I’m so good, but it was just random.
Gitschier: Tell us about your educa-
tion for this case. Although you hadn’t
heard of ID, you likely had heard of
creationism or creation science. Had this
been a field that you followed at all?
Jones: No, not other than popular
culture. When I went to law school in the
late ’70s, I followed the progression of
cases that we talked about before. I
understood the general theme. I’d seen
Inherit the Wind.
Gitschier: So now it’s on your docket,
and you must have been curious. Did you
Google intelligent design?
Jones: No. I got what I needed in the
context of the case. And it was the monster
on my docket.
To your question: I think laypersons
apprehend that when we get a case, it’s
incumbent upon us to go into an intensive
study mode to learn everything about it.
Actually that is the wrong thing to do. The
analogy is that when I have a jury trial in
front of me, I always instruct jurors,
particularly in this day and age when
you can Google anything, not to do that. I
don’t want you to do any research or
investigation. Everything you need to
decide this case you’ll get within the
corners of this courtroom.
So it is with me. And I knew that by the
time the case went to trial and during the
trial, that I would get expert reports.
Gitschier: From whom?
Jones: Everybody. The way expert
opinion works is that I get a summary of
their testimony first, and that I can read in
advance. So I have a flavor for it. So then
the question is, why also have them testify?
That is because they are subject to cross
examination and everything they say may
not hold up that well. And, as it turned
out, some of it didn’t during the trial.
In any event, I was taken to school.
From the earliest point in the litigation to
the time the briefs were filed, it was the
equivalent of a degree in this area. Folks
who disagree with my opinion will tell you
I never got it right, but I’m confident that I
did.
Go back to your last question. It’s very
critical. I have to decide cases on the facts
that are before me. I can’t decide a case
based on my own opinion, gleaned from
outside the courtroom. That’s why I don’t
engage in my own independent investiga-
tion. If you look at other systems in other
countries throughout the world, they do
that. But in our system of justice in the US,
we let the parties try their cases and we
find the facts from what is presented to us
in the courtroom. And the law, presum-
ably we know and we apply the law.
That’s our job. But the facts that we apply
the law to are covered at that time.
Gitschier: I don’t know if you’re even
allowed to answer this. Before this case
landed on your lap, did you have any
thoughts about creationism or evolution,
or the debate?
Jones: The precursor to my answer is
that it doesn’t matter. A judge could be an
avowed creationist, but he’s got to rule
based on the facts and the law. In that
event, he’d have to hold his nose and do
his duty as a judge.
I am a person of faith. I’m certainly not
an atheist or an agnostic and I see some
divine force somewhere. That said, having
had a pretty good education, a great
liberal arts education at Dickinson Col-
lege, I must say that I never had any
substantial doubts about evolution gener-
ally. I had forgotten, admittedly, a lot of
what I had learned about evolution back
in college. Moreover, a lot had happened
since the ’70s, so my understanding was
rudimentary. But I never had a crisis of
confidence about evolution or a reason to
doubt that it constituted a valid theory and
good science.
Gitschier: Regarding the Memoran-
dum Opinion itself, I found parts of it
astonishing. You used words like ‘‘men-
dacity,’’ ‘‘sham,’’ ‘‘breath-taking inanity of
the board’s decision.’’
Jones: You should have been there.
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are impartial. What were some of the
highlights? What were the transformation-
al points in the trial that then allowed you
to say, ‘‘OK, I’m going to rule this way’’?
Jones: I don’t think there was an
epiphany. The very first witness for the
plaintiffs was Ken Miller. He is very
invested in this issue. He writes a textbook
that is used substantially in high school
biology classes throughout the country.
And I think it’s fair to say that the plaintiffs
knew what they had in terms of their
judge. They knew that I was not a
scientist, but hopefully that I had a
reasonably good head on my shoulders,
that they were going to need to take me to
school. So their first witness did just that.
I will always remember Ken Miller’s
testimony in the sense that he did A–Z
evolution. And then got into intelligent
design. And having laid the foundation
with the description of evolution, got into
why intelligent design doesn’t work as
science, to the point where it is predom-
inantly a religious concept.
Gitschier: Is the other side objecting
all the time?
Jones: They can object to a question
that is truly objectionable. But there
weren’t a huge amount of objections. I
let both parties try their case. They knew
they’d have their turn.
Which gets me to the next point.
Another remarkable moment on the
science side was Michael Behe, who was
the lead witness for the defendants, and a
very amiable fellow, as was Ken Miller,
but unlike Miller, in my view, Professor
Behe did not distinguish himself. He did
not hold up well on cross-examination.
So on the science side those were the
two remarkable witnesses, although there
were many expert witnesses in the field of
theology, paleontology, biology, pedagogy.
Gitschier: It’s almost like a command
performance! There’s no jury, it’s not
televised. All of these knowledgeable
people…
Jones: Playing to an audience of one.
Which was fascinating.
In the realm of the lay witnesses, if you
will, some of the school board witnesses
were dreadful witnesses and hence the
description ‘‘breathtaking inanity’’ and
‘‘mendacity.’’ In my view, they clearly lied
under oath. They made a very poor
account of themselves. They could not
explain why they did what they did. They
really didn’t even know what intelligent
design was. It was quite clear to me that
they viewed intelligent design as a method
to get creationism into the public school
classroom. They were unfortunate and
troublesome witnesses. Simply remark-
able, in that sense.
Gitschier: Did Miller talk about
molecular evolution, DNA sequences,
etc.?
Jones: To the extent that he needed to.
Gitschier: Because the evidence is
amazing.
Jones: It is stunning when you get into
it. Broadly, as the trial progressed, what
was remarkable to me, as you go back—
you well know this in your field—people
called it Darwin’s theory of evolution.
Here’s Charles Darwin, who had not the
benefit at all of genetics, and yet from my
view, almost every subsequent discovery
tends to bear out Darwin’s theory and has
only made it stronger, including the field
of genetics. But Ken Miller went into the
immune system, the blood clotting cas-
cade, and the bacterial flagellum—all
three are held out by intelligent design
proponents as irreducibly complex, and in
effect, having no precursors. He [Miller]
knocked that down, I thought, quite
effectively—so comprehensively and so
well. By the time Miller was done
testifying, over the span of a couple of
days, the defendants were really already in
the hole.
But I can’t decide the case until I hear
all the evidence, and I didn’t.
Gitschier: I want to address a very
specific part of your Memorandum Opin-
ion, which is defining science. What were
you trying to do here?
Jones: First of all, both sides presented
ample scientific testimony, and they asked
me to decide that.
Gitschier: Both parties wanted you to
address the question of what is science?
Jones: Well, not what is science, but
whether intelligent design is science. Why
else would they have presented all those
expert witnesses?
Gitschier: Do they explicitly say that?
Jones: Sure they do.
Gitschier: Is that part of the original
suit?
Jones: Yes, part of the analysis—the
second prong of the Lemon test and the
collapsed endorsement test [see Sidebar
(Box 1)]—is the effect on the intended
recipients. My view, and I’ll always believe
that I was right about this until somebody
convinces me otherwise, is that if you’re
going to measure the effect of a particular
policy, in this case juxtaposing intelligent
design with evolution, on the intended
recipients, you have to delve into what the
policy is about. What was it about? It was
about intelligent design. And to try to
determine the effect on the recipients you
have to determine what does that concept
Box 1. Sidebar: The Judge
Provides a Primer
Gitschier: There are a number of
things in your Memorandum Opin-
ion that I want you to flesh out for
our readers. One is the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amend-
ment. Second is the Lemon test and
the prongs of the Lemon test. And
the third thing that I really wasn’t
clear on was the endorsement test.
Jones: Lot of lawyers aren’t clear
on that either; it’s very complex.
The Establishment Clause as con-
tained in the First Amendment,
simply stated, says that Congress
shall pass no law that, in effect,
favors an established religion. It’s
been the subject of a great deal of
debate. Initially, in its inception, it
was applicable only to Federal
government, but with the Four-
teenth Amendment, it was made
applicable to the states, and hence,
applicable to any governmental or
quasi-governmental body including
a school board. So there is no
debate that the school board was
subject to strictures of the estab-
lishment clause of the First Amend-
ment.
There is a vigorous debate that
takes place, to this day, as to
whether there is a wall of separa-
tion between church and state, as
Thomas Jefferson opined. That
phrase doesn’t appear anywhere in
the Constitution. However, the Su-
preme Court of the United States
has clearly set out, in its decisions
over the past 60 years, that there is
a wall, porous at times, but a wall
nonetheless. So the common
theme of their decisions is that they
are going to look with a high
degree of scrutiny on government
activity that seems to favor a
particular religious concept. Hence
the line of cases we talked about
before.
Now the devil is in the details, and
so it then fell to the Justices to
develop, as they typically do in
cases like this, tests—overlays, if
you will—that they put against the
facts that are found by judges, so
that the judges can decide whether
a violation has occurred. As you
might expect, because every case is
so intensively fact-specific, some-
times these tests are really hard to
apply.
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search and examination of what exactly
does ID say, what is its basis, what are its
scientific bona fides or lack thereof. That
opens the door for a determination of
whether ID is in fact science. And that is
what that part of the opinion was.
People shouldn’t mischaracterize it and
say that I am the arbiter of what science is
broadly. It’s not what I wrote about in the
opinion. I wrote about whether ID, as
presented to me, in that courtroom from
September to November of 2005, was
science, and I said it was not. That it was
the progeny, the successor to creationism
and creation science. That it was dressed-
up creationism.
Gitschier: Nonetheless, you have cap-
tured the essence of science in your
opinion.
Jones: Well, you could read it that way
if you chose to. What it does contain is
something that you could utilize as a
portable mechanism to look at other
concepts and decide whether they were
science. But the question I decided was
whether ID was science. And you use tools
like—is it testable? Is it peer reviewed? Is it
generally accepted in the scientific com-
munity? And the answer to all three of
those things is ‘‘No.’’
Gitschier: Let’s talk about what hap-
pened downstream of this decision. How
will this change affect the landscape of
education in the US?
Jones: The short answer is that I don’t
know. In the two and a half years since the
opinion was released, no one has tried to
teach ID in the US. Remember, the
opinion doesn’t have precedential effect
outside of Pennsylvania. In other words, I
am a Federal District court with jurisdic-
tion over this big middle of Pennsylvania,
but I’m not the Supreme Court of the
United States. So, it’s unlike the mandates
from the Supreme Court that we were
discussing earlier such as Epperson and
Edwards. Those are the final words for
now, and everyone must adhere to them. I
suppose a school board in another state
could still pass a law mandating the
teaching of ID, and in fact some were
considering doing so at the time of this
trial, but later pulled them down. But I do
think that many consider my opinion
persuasive, if not binding, and that’s why
you have not seen these policies enacted.
Gitschier: Such as in Kansas?
Jones: Such as in Kansas. Kansas at
that time was having [state-wide] school
board elections. And this became an issue
in Kansas, and Kansans did not elect
proponents of ID, utilizing my decision I
think, saying that it was improvident to do
this. In Ohio, they had begun steps that
would have allowed the teaching of ID,
and the school board ruled the policy back
because of my decision, not because they
had to, but they thought it was persuasive.
Florida had a debate last year, into this
year about changing some of their stan-
dards or adopting new standards of
science, again citing my decision.
The hotbeds today—and this is re-
emerging—Texas has a very strong desire
to get into something like teaching intel-
ligent design. Louisiana just passed a
stature that seems like it could be used as
a vehicle for teaching ID. This is specu-
lation on my part—I don’t think that the
concept of ID itself has a lot of vitality
going forward. The Dover trial discredited
that thing that is ID. To the extent that I
follow it—I’m curious about it, but it
doesn’t go any further than that—the
likely tack going forward is something like
teach the controversy, talk about the alleged
flaws and gaps in the theory of evolution
and go to that place first.
They gave me the last word in ‘‘Judg-
ment Day’’ [a NOVA program on the
trial] and I said this is not something that
will be settled in my time or even in my
grandchildren’s lifetimes. It’s an enduring,
quintessentially American, dispute. If you
poll in the US today, you’ll find that
approximately half of our fellow citizens
believe in creationism and think that
creationism ought to taught.
Gitschier: I had no idea!
Jones: Believe me. Remember, the
Dover School Board was comprised of
young-earth creationists. They believe that
the Bible is the Word. They either can’t
explain or like not to explain the evidence
to the contrary. Then there are the mixed-
bag creationists—creationists who accept
that the world is as old as it is but don’t
accept evolutionary mechanism.
Gitschier: How has this trial changed
your life? Both externally and in the way
you think about the world.
Jones: It’s changed my life forever.
You can’t go through something like this
that has such notoriety without being
changed. Federal Judges at any level lead
quite cloistered existences, and I was
thrust onto the stage in a way that I would
never have thought possible. And I have
been speaking all around the US, but I
don’t go and try to say what I did in the
opinion.
What I developed was a passion for the
concept known as ‘‘judicial indepen-
dence,’’ meaning that concomitantly with
the science education issue that I just
raised, I don’t think Americans under-
stand how judges operate.
I had a lot of criticism after this
decision; a lot, I think, was born out of
ignorance about how we do things. People
didn’t understand there was a Lemon test
So the first test that the Court came
up with is the Lemon test, Lemon v.
Kurtzman [another Pennsylvania
case regarding the reimbursement
of Catholic schools by the state
superintendent of schools].
What came out of Lemon were
three prongs that judges have to
look at. The first is: what is the
purpose of the enactment? The
second is: what is the effect of the
enactment? And the third is: is
there an excessive entanglement
between religion and government?
I’ll come back and be specific to my
case [in a minute]. As time went by,
it was apparent that the Lemon test
was somewhat difficult to apply in
certain factual situations. In partic-
ular it was found to be difficult to
apply in cases where, for example,
the Ten Commandments were bolt-
ed onto the side of a courthouse or
government building. So Former
Justice Sandra Day O’Conner then
penned the ‘‘endorsement test.’’
The endorsement test, boiled down
to its essence, takes the first two
prongs—the purpose and the effect
prongs—and collapses them to-
gether, and just makes it easier to
apply, although it is always hard to
judge these cases.
To go back to the Lemon test. If the
judge finds that the purpose is
predominantly religious, you can
stop; you don’t have to go to the
other prongs. But if you find it’s OK,
you can go to the effect prong—
what is the effect on the intended
recipients of the policy? How do
they view it? If you find a violation
there, you needn’t go to the exces-
sive entanglement prong.
In my case [Kitzmiller], it failed the
purpose prong, and the excessive
entanglement prong was never at
issue, by agreement of counsel on
both sides. But for the sake of
completeness, because I had to
believe that my decision would be
appealed, I did the effect prong as
well. And I also did the endorse-
ment test. But the endorsement
test is just a variation on the Lemon
test, and is in some ways a duplica-
tion of the Lemon test, with a twist.
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made this up as I went along. They think
judges rule according to their own philo-
sophical biases or predilections. I thought
it was incumbent upon me to get out and
talk about that and say, ‘‘Well, you don’t
quite have this right,’’ and I’ve been very
well received across the country.
But from the NOVA show to the now
four books that have been written about
the case, to being on the cover of Time
magazine, for someone born and raised in
a town of 2,000 in upstate PA—all this is
fairly miraculous stuff that I never thought
I would do. So, it certainly has changed
the fabric of my life, that I have had this
interval. It will die down, I know.
When I take my last breath and they
publish my obituary, the first line will say
that I presided over the intelligent design
trial. I can’t top this, I don’t think, and I’m
fine with that, if this is what I’m
remembered for. I’m proud of what I
did. I thought I discharged my obligations
and my duties well.
Going forward, has it made me more
curious about the issue? Yes, and I think
I’ll always have that enduring curiosity.
Recommended reading from the Judge:
N Summer for the Gods by Edward J.
Larson;
N The Devil in Dover by Lauri Lebo;
N 40 Days and 40 Nights by Matthew
Chapman.
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